The first engagement between the forces of King James II and William of Orange took place in Carrickarnon near the junction with the Edentubber Road on Sunday 22nd June 1690
King William III landed at Carrickfergus on 14th June 1690, bringing 16,000 men to join the 20,000 already in the field. His march south to do battle with James II (his father-in-law) was slow, not least because his generals expected the Jacobite forces to make a stand in or around the Gap of the North, which still had a fearsome reputation from the battles against O’Neill a century before.
Indeed, it is believed James’s generals argued in favour of stopping the Williamites between Newry and Dundalk and that it was James himself who over-ruled them and decided to make his stand at the Boyne. However, substantial forces were brought towards Dundalk and some of them pushed towards Newry.
James had many French officers supplied by his own father-in-law, Louis XIV. One of them, Le Marquis de la Hoguette, wrote from Ardee to the French Minister of War that 1500 soldiers were occupying “un chateau sur le grand chemin de Nury (a castle on the main road to Newry)” which sounds like Moyra Castle – but is it?
There was another castle, at Flurrybridge or the Four Mile Water as it was known. It may also have been called the Halfway Bridge. O. Davies (1938) wrote that a small fort was erected there in 1624 to command the crossing of the Flurry.
http://apps.ehsni.gov.uk/ambit/Details.aspx?MonID=6156 Read PDF on right,page 33
It was known as Waterfort but was also called Four Mile House. The site is unknown but Davies makes the sensible point that it was probably on high ground and the closest is to the east, beside the Carrickdale.
Some of you may remember from the Walk Talks that when you see a castle, you should try to find the quarry the stone came from and a road joining the two. Neither is a problem in this case. The early Baby Boomers out there may remember that the Roadhouse, forerunner of the Carrickdale, was actually built in a quarry so there was stone close at hand.
Diary of Jacobite officer John Stevens
Saturday the 21st: a strong detachment of firelocks was sent out to a castle on the Newry road. At night 200 chosen men out of five regiments, being 40 of each, were sent to lie upon Newry road upon intelligence of some party of the enemy advancing.
Sunday the 22nd: a party of horse under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Dempsey,144 advancing towards Newry, fell into a body of the enemy and, being overpowered, retreated; till coming to the above said detachment of 200 foot under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel FitzGerald145 and finding them receive the enemy vigorously, they rallied. The rebels made no great resistance, our foot firing hotly, but fled towards Newry, the horse pursuing them a considerable space. Of the rebels above sixty were killed, of ours a few wounded and fewer killed, among which was Lieutenant-Colonel Laurence Dempsey, shot through the shoulder whereof he died.
Thanks to PJ Goode, a descendant of the unfortunate Dempsey, who sent me these texts. The Jacobite Narrative of the War in Ireland refers to
“… between two hundred and three hundred English foot and dragoons, at the other end of the pass, who, it seems, were coming from the Newry towards Dundalk, to know the king’s strength, and how his army lay. The Irish suffered them to pass the causeway and then they poured their shot in amongst them. There was a return made. But the English dragoons being more numerous charged the Irish horse with such fierceness, that they disordered the troop. ”
The causeway referred to is the ‘broken causie’ which figured so often in the accounts of the O’Neill Wars. On the main road just past the Edentubber turn there is a little narrow road on the left that runs north to Kinney’s Mill, parallel to the main road. This is the original road, which dips down towards the stream which marks the border. Drainage is still poor around there, but back then there was a substantial bog crossed by some sort of raised causeway, possibly with a wooden bridge or portion. It may have been known as the Five Mile Bridge although less than an Irish mile from the Four Mile Bridge.
Armies of the time were trained to form up in fighting lines of 50 or 100 across if possible – they were vulnerable when strung out in columns for marching. The standard Irish ambush technique was to lie in wait at natural choke points – bridges, fords and bog crossings. The Davies article points out that the word Pass (sometimes spelt Pace) was used in the 16th century not to describe mountain crossings but valley crossings which were more dangerous. The causeway would probably only have been wide enough for two horsemen or four or five pikemen or musketeers. The ambush party would suddenly fire from the bushes and hope to punch a hole in the middle of the column so that it could no longer fight as a single unit.
The ambush was not accidental – the Jacobites had observed that scouting parties were approaching the Half-Way Bridge every night. The fact that they had sent 60 Dragoons (horse) and 200 foot probably meant they intended to push on towards Moyra if they met no resistance.
The ‘broken causie’ of Carrickarnon is shown in the sketch map below, which seems to be by our old friend Bartlett, the mapmaker to Lord Mountjoy.
Anyone wanting to brush up on their 17th century French can read the full account of Le Marquis de la Hoguette here: FullTFrenchtext
Franco-Irish Corespondence 1688-92 vol.1, p.440, edited by Sheila Molloy PHD; IMC Dublin 1983
A French lieutenant- general, the Marquis de la Hoguette wrote on 4th July from the camp at Ardee, addressing his letter to Louis XIV ‘s minister-at- war Marquis de Louvois and describing the incident of two weeks previosly thus..
‘.. le Roy s’est avancē a Dundalk avec son armēe, oū il a demeurē quatre jours, et y a consomē le plus de fouragges qu’il a peu. J’y arrivai avec les sept bataillons francois deaux jours apres lui, et y ayant pris le mesme jour mon jour de lieutenant general, apres avoir fait monter les gardes le lendermain matin, et postē celles qu’on jugea a propos d’augmenter, j’allay visiter toutes les autres, et les postes d’infanterie qu’on occupoit pour la seuretē du camp. Ayant appris par l’officier qui commandoit quinze cent hommes qu’on avoit mis dans un chateau sur le grand chemin de Nury, avec vingt dragons qu’on avancoit ce jour a un pont, qui estoit a une demye lieue de lá, que les ennemis estoient venus la nuit avec une trouppe de cavalerie de quarante maistres, trente dragons, et deux cent hommes de pied jusques au pont, d’ou ils avoient envoyē leurs dragons et leur cavalerie jusque aupres du chateau, et avoient poussē nos batteurs d’estrade assez pres dudit chateau, j’avertis le Roy a mon retour sur le dessein qu’il avoit pris de mettrs une embuscade dans ce meme lieu, qu’il etoit necessaire qu’il y envoyast un gros party, ētant certain que les ennemis ayants ētē decouverts, s’ils y revenoient, y reviendroient encore plus forts qu’ils n’y avoient paru les jours precedents. Le Roy sur cela, a qui il estoit important de scavoir des nouvelles des ennemis, fit commander deux cent fusilliers et trois troupes de trente maistres commandēs par un lieutenant colonel irlandois pour pour les soutenir, avec ordre a nostre embuscade de laisser passer les ennemis, et de ne leur tirer qu’apres qu’ils seroient passēs, ce qui devoit ētre le signal a nostre cavalerie de debusquer.
Cela ne se passa pas tout a fait ainsy, car le lieu n’estant pas propre pour couvrir et cacher nostre infanterie, les coureurs des ennemis, qui marchoient devant eux, les decouvrirent. Celui qui les commandoit, bien loing de se retirer, ētant venu a la charge, nos gens essuyerent leur decharges et apres, leur firent a leur d’asses pres, ce qui arresta les ennemis, et fit fuir absolument leurs dragons, sans qu’on les revit d’avantage. Cependant les uns et les autres estants ocupez a recharger leurs armes, nostre cavalerie ayant debusquē, vint au feu, et ayant trouvē les ennemis qui avoient rechargē, essuia leurs descharges, de laquelle le lieutenant colonel du regiment de Galmoy, qui commandoit, fut blessē fort dangereusement et six ou sept cavaliers, et outant de chevaux. Cette descharge faite de prēs rompit et ebranla un peu nostre cavalerie, ce qui ne peut pas estre autrement. Nostre infanterie cependant ayant rechargē, le lieutenant colonel qui la commandoit voyant que les ennemis pretendoient tirer quelque avantage de l‘effet qu’ils avoient faits sur la cavalerie, dit a ses gens qu’il falloit par cette descharge entrer dans les ennemis, a quoy ayant repondu qu’ils le suivroient, il marcha droit a eaux, et en effet ne tira qu’a brusle pourpoint, et entra dans les ennemis l’espēe a la main, et a coups de crosse de mousquets, si bien que nostre cavalerie, laquelle sans fuir s’etoit raliēe presque sur son terrain, etant revenue a la charge des trouva meslēs, et s’estant mis de la partie, ils furent entierement rompus et defaits. De quatre capitaines qu’il y avoit dans le party, trois furent pris, et le, quatriesme on le croit mort, et quarente cinq a cinquante hommes de tuēs et sept ou huit prisoniers. Comme il faisoit un fort grand brouillard, et que d’ailleurs nostre cavelerie avoit un ordre tres expres de ne pas passer un second pont, qui estoit a un demy quart de lieue de lá, cela en sauva beaucoup, car ils se jetterent a droit et a gauche, dans la montaigne, ou on ne les peut voir a cause du brouillard.
Ce petit avantage a fait d’autant plus de plaisir au Roy d’ Angleterre et a toutes ses troupes, que c’est la premiere curēe qu’elles ayent eu depuis cette guerre, et vous pouves compter. Monseigneur, que l’on donnera tous ses soins pour le conserver toutes les fois que nous serons obligēs d’en venir aux mains. Outre cet esprit est bon en toute situation, il est encore plus necessaire en celle ou nous sommes qu’en toute autre, puis q’ayant affaire a un ennemy superieur en force, et etant necessaire pour le bien des affaires de se tenir sur la defensive, si nous ne leur imposions par les affaires que nous aurons avec eux, nous serions des gens perdus. Les demarches de defensive ne contribuent pas a inspirer de l’audace au soldat, et les officiers en prennent souvent de la crainte. Cependant on ne negligera rien pour leur fair veoir que ce n’est que pour combattre plus a propos, et plus a nostre avantage. Ainsy j’espere que la bonne volontē s’y conservera et que toutes les troupes feront leur devoir.,